STA NDA RDS -IF WE DON'T SET THEM, JUR
IES WILL
by Davi d C. Oliver
Intro ducti on
In prep aring for this Foru m, I bega n with sever
inclu ding helpi ng you to unde rstan d the chan ging al purpo ses in mind ,
climate in which highw ay
agencies, in fact, all public and quasi-public entiti es,
vulne rable to tort liabil ity litigation. That is not an are incre asing ly
becau se we are often viewed as a cause of the probl easy task for a lawyer,
But the fact is, we in twen tieth- centu ry America areem, not a solution to it.
sue over physical injur y, offenses to our dignity, percea litigious society. We
right s, and incre asing ly over ment al pain and suffe ived violations of our
ing (wha t I refer to as the new practice of stres s rsuits).
Once we accept the fact that we can and will be
sued, we can devote our atten tion to the more impo
rtant matt ers of providing the highe st degree of
· safet y for the trave ling public. We can do this with
the assis tance of tort law, becau se study of the cases
helps us in ident ifyin g poten tial liability situa tions
and in recognizing appro priat e actions to reduce
liabil ity (including those actions that have withstood
legal challenge).
Ther e are many varia bles with which you should
be famil iar in discu ssing liability. (1) The conce
legal duty is the first requisite. In any liability pt of
action, it must be estab lishe d that the agency owes
a
duty to the publ ic-th at duty is gene rally to keep the
safe for trave l. (2) Next, you should be awar e that thehighw ays reaso nably
courts will look for a
breac h of that duty -neg ligen ce, by omission or
ission, must be estab lished. The negli gent beha vior must be found to comm
prox imat e-tha t is, the most foreseeable cause have been the
finally, there must be some dama ge or injury. of the accident. (3) And
Ther e have been judic ial decisions in just the
of issue s. The court s continue to review the natur epast two years on a varie ty
design, and const ruct highw ays as this duty is effecof the duty to main tain,
ted by the legislative and
judic ial gran ts or withd rawa ls of immu nity. Much
has
the loss by the state s of sovereign immunity, by the taken place recen tly in
limit ation s placed on
discretionary' immu nity, and by the gradu al reintr
oduc
tion at the legislative
level of qualified immu nity, requi ring strict notice
and
limit ing the amou nt of
awar ds.
We have seen the development of a changed conditions
doctrine, which
furth er limit s the discr etion ary immu nity and requi
res
conti
nued review and
upda ting of highw ays designed and const ructe d in
an
earli
er
time to stand ards and specifications no longer applicable. We have
of economic defense doctrine, wherein state agencies seen the development
soph istica ted in plead ing budg etary impa cts on their have become more
programs. We have seen
the dram atic impa ct that is had on state progr ams
by
being avail able and natio nal stand ards being appli virtu e offed eral money
ed.
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We have seen the exten sion of legal claim s to man
y activ ities neve r
prev iousl y enco unter ed. In just the past two year
deali ng with accid ents at snowmobile-highway s, cases have been repo rted
crossings, objects drop ped
from overpasses, mini bike -truc k collisions,
rcycle accid ents involving
vehi cular collisions or fixed object collisions,moto
trees
and poles alongside the
roadway, collisions with cons truct ion equi pme
nt
and
the illum inati on of
high ways .
In Minn esota , the cour ts have furth er limit ed
the policy role imm unity in
hold ing that such decisions as a state traffic
engi
neer'
s deter mina tion of a
spee d for a spee d zone which is requ ested by a
county would not be accorded
policy decision protection as this is a "professio
county's decision not to place guar drail s at a nal judg ment ." Simi larly , a
way accid ent site is also
professional judg ment , rathe r than policy-mahigh
king.
decision mus t involve a balan cing of policy objec For these courts, a
policy in Ohio, wher ein it has been held that a tives. Cont rast this to the
township decision not to place
or main tain safet y devices at a railr oad crossing
duty to do so) is entit led to protection as a discr (where there is not statu tory
etion ary decision.
Ther e are man y cases we can look at and man
y area s we could discuss in
detai l, inclu ding discretion, design, work zone
traff
safety, and the dang er of railr oad crossings. I thou ic control, economics vs.
ful for this Foru m if I focused on two disti nct typesght it would be most helpof cases. One line of cases
discu sses the need to mon itor accid ent data and
repo
rts of haza rdou s conditions and the duty to take corrective action in
stan dard s and studi es. The othe r line of cases relia nce on engi neer ing
will discuss the grow ing concern s with the need s and dutie s surro undi ng the
Keep in mind as I discuss these cases that the light ing on our highways.
den t-it build s on prior decisions. But, the lawlaw is an instr ume nt of preceand evolving in respo nse to facts and techn ical also is cons tantl y chan ging
developments.
Duty and Negligence Case s
The case of Molbert v. Toepfer (La., 1989 invol
ved a suit by a pass enge r
critically injur ed when a car in which he was) ridin
g lost control on a curve
and ran into a utilit y pole.
Ther e was much testi mon y concerning the desig
n and main tena nce of the
curve. It was deter mine d that the curve was inad
verte
ntly cons truct ed with a
high er degree of curv ature than called for by the
limit on the road was 35 mph. Ther e was no redu design plan s. The spee d
there were chevrons, or curve signs. The desig ced speed limit , altho ugh
n speed of the curve is 27 mph ,
and a ball- bank indic ator test found the comfort
barri cade had been erect ed in 1981 to prote ct a speed to be 25 mph. A
The barri cade has been hit by cars five times. hous e that had been hit twice.
The DOT was found five perc ent negl igen t on a
recovery of $1,250,000 .
The plain tiff suffered a severe head injur y with
perm
anen t brain dama ge. He
was in a coma for one mon th, will neve r be able
he once lived and need s cons tant care and supe to live the norm al active life
him as a 28-year-old with the men tality of a 7 rvision. His fathe r described
or 8 year old. Ther e was
alcohol involved.
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Trahan v. State (La., 1988) involved
app roxi mat ely 10:30 p.m . The wea ther an accident tha t occurred at
ing on cruise control at 59 mph. The carwas clea r and dry. The car was trav elneg otia ted all _curves except the last
one, which was post ed at 45 mph. The
driv
er disengaged cruise and slowed
down. However, coming out of the curv
sam e time he noticed a 25-mph speed e he rese t the cruise control. At the
app lied his brak es and beg an slowing. advisory sign and a curve sign. He
Wh en he looked up, a sha rp curve app He became mom enta rily inat tent ive.
thro ugh the curve, and stru ck a tree 13eare d. He was una ble to stop, wen t
feet away.
The cou rt found tha t DOT had a legal
duty to war n aga inst an
exceedingly dan gero us curve, exte ndin
inad vert entl y inat tent ive. The degree g even to a driv er who mig ht be
of curv atur e of the curve is 28 degrees
The curr ent DOT stan dard s proh ibit con
.
degrees. Alth oug h conceding that DOT struction of a curve exceeding 5-1/2
exis ting sub stan dard road up to curr entis not und er an obligation to brin g an
men t tha t such road s be ade qua tely sign design stan dard s, ther e is a requ ireed.
The curve was dan gero us beca use of curv
atur e and inad equ ate signing.
At the time of the accident ther e were
no
sign
s to deli neat e the location of the
-curve. However, in 1968 (some 20 yea
rs
prev
ious
) ther e were num erou s
haz ardo us signs deli nea ting this curve.
shoulder, were fully reflective, and coul The y were located on the outs ide
d be seen bi-directionally. The se sign s
were removed beca use two DOT employe
and also freq uen tly knocked down. The es dete rmi ned they were outd ated
tion of a flat -arr ow sign; however ther se employees did dire ct the inst alla e is no record of follow-up to asce rtai n
if the sign was inst alle d. The sign, was
not in place at the time of the accident
.
A stat e troo per test ified tha t he had inve
stig ated at leas t six or seven
acci den ts at this location. He rela ted his
curve to DOT and requ este d they look concern abo ut the problem with this
into the situ atio n.
The re were mar king s, a curve-advisory
feet from the curve, and no-passing strip sign, a speed plat e loca ted 416
bee n ade qua te for a norm ally caut ious es. The cou rt found thes e mig ht hav e
driver, but not for one mom enta rily
inat tent ive.
The DOT was found to be 50 perc ent neg
lige nt on a recovery of
$1,700.000 plus.
The plai ntif f und erw ent removal of a bon
e from his brai n and removal of
the tip of his left tem pora l lobe (15 perc
ent
of
his brain). He has an acrylic
plat e in his hea d. His righ t lung collapse
and tracheotomy. He was trea ted for gastd and he und erw ent a thoracostomy
roin test inal complications and
part ial para lysi s of his left vocal cord
He developed tum ors on his han ds and
fingers, probably the resu lt of taki ng .phe
pers ona lity has chan ged from easy-goi nob arbi tal since his lobectomy. His
tal. He is also severely scar red and disfng to argu men tativ e and tem pera men igured.
The re was indication of alcohol but no
intoxication.
Dill v. State (La., 1988) involved a two-car
accident at 12:05 p.m. It was
ligh tly rain ing and the road was wet. Veh
icle
1
ente red the curve, slowed,
slid, and imp acte d with Vehicle 2.
The road in que stio n is a two-lane,
rura l roadway, Cla ss 2 arte rial high way20-foot-wide bitu min ous- surf aced
The DOT Man ual requ ires a degree of with 11,000 vehicle traffic volume.
curv atur e app roxi mat ely 1/2 of tha t
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existing. The standards also require a 12-foot lane width and 4-foot shoulder,
rather than the 10-foot lanes and narrow unsurfaced shoulders at the site.
The superelevation was substandard, which produced a wavy surface and
fluctuating coefficient of friction. There was considerable wear, pot marks,
cracking, and deterioration of the roadway, especially at the right wheel path
in the westbound lane.
The ball-bank indicator test showed a correct speed posting of 30 mph
under dry weather conditions. The critical speed before sliding was estimated
at 45-50 mph by DOT's expert and at 38-41 mph by the plaintiff's expert,
assuming a uniform surface and condition. However, the plaintiff's expert
said the critical speed would be 30 mph in consideration of the severe degree
of curvature, lane width, superelevation, wear of roadway, and wet pavement.
The sheriff's office produced a total of 72 accident reports occurring at
this site between 1978 and 1985. Twenty-three of these accidents occurred in
1984 with 10 the same as this accident, three were at 35 mph, one at 15 mph,
and one at 25 mph. All reports are forwarded to the state police who, in turn,
supply the information to the Highway Safety Commission and DOT.
There was also a 1982 report from the district traffic operations engineer
which predicted an increase in accidents and recommended reconstruction to
a more favorable alignment. The cost estimate was $164,000. DOT did
initiate a project to realign the road and decrease the degree of curvature.
DOT was held to be 100 percent negligent on a total recovery of $230,000.
The plaintiff suffered six cracked ribs and a fractured spine. A halo was
installed in his skull securing sharp screws through a ring and down into the
skull base, then attaching the ring to a chest support. The halo has been
removed and replaced by a Philadelphia collar, then a soft collar. She
sustained facial scarring.
There was a dissent in this case. The judge acknowledged that the
location in question was "not constructed as a modem highway and is in need
of repair." However, he noted, the state was aware of this and had reconstruction scheduled. In the meantime, precautions had been taken-large signs
were posted (reducing the speed limit from 35 mph to 30 mph) on the
mounting for the curve sign; there were large chevrons, and a flashing light
to get motorists' attention. There was a yellow "no passing" line in the curve.
Also, all the motorists involved in this accident were thoroughly familiar with
the location.
The judge stated, "It seems obvious to me from a reading of the entire
record that the major fault found with the DOTO was in the failure to
reconstruct that roadway to modern-day standards. The record clearly
reflects that the department had, in fact, planned to reconstruct certain
segments of this roadway, but that this reconstruction had not yet taken
place ... Meanwhile, the department has taken every considerable step to
adequately mark the curve to warn reasonably prudent and attentive drivers
of the roadway conditions."
In Van De Bogart v. State (N.Y., 1987) the claimant was injured in a onecar accident which occurred at 5 a.m. The car went off the road at a left-hand
curve, continued on a path over the recessed headwall of a culvert, and
struck a tree located some 12 feet from the road. The road is a rural, lightly
traveled road constructed in 1928 and designated as a Class C highway. It
has two 10-foot paved lanes with shoulders partially paved to a distance of
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abou t 3 feet. It had been resur faced in 1981 The
cent er and edge lines have
been repa inted . At this curve, the state had .insta
lled
traffic control and
safet y meas ures consisting of a poste d 45 mph
sign, a left arrow sign at the curve, a diam ond-redu ced speed sign, a curve
shap ed culv ert mark er, and
reflectorized delineators.
The left arrow sign had recen tly been adde
mad e in respo nse to a comp laint from an adjoi d following an inve stiga tion
ning prop erty owner, following
a fatal accid ent in 1981.
The claim ant's expe rt contended that in 1981,
the state was awar e of the
dang ers at this site and should have reco nstru
orde r to elim inate or improve the curve; failingcted, rath er than repa ved, in
been erect ed to shield the culvert, the tree shou that, a guar drail shou ld have
speed at the curve should have been redu ced to ld have been removed, the
of the curve rath er than the single arrow should35 mph and chevron signi ng
have been insta lled.
The cour t said, "In main taini ng older highways
to unde rtake expensive reconstruction simply beca , the state is not obligated
stan dard s have chan ged since the original cons use high way safet y design
thou gh the shap e of the road and exte nt of the truction .... Thus , even
it did not comply with curre nt crite ria, no majo'safe recovery area ' adjoining
r restr uctu ring was requ ired
unle ss the curve could not safely have been nego
tiate d at mod erate spee d ....
"The decision not to modify the curve by high way
reco nstru ction and to
fix the poste d speed at 45 mph was mad e delib
thoro ugh analy sis of the accident record of the erate ly after considering a
section of Route 357 involved,
the existence of num erou s roadside obstacles, the
prior ities, and appr opria te testi ng estab lishi ng relat ive costs and fiscal
the safe speed for nego tiatin g
the curve ....
"Such judg men tal decisions are precisely the kind
that are clothed with
qualified gove rnme ntal imm unity ....
"The re has been no showing that the state 's delib
erative process concerning the resur facin g project was inad equa te or that
its
repa ving and the
resig ning plan lacked a reaso nabl e basis.
'Wit h respe ct to the removal of the tree, quali
fied safet y engineer,
following the 1981 accident, inve stiga ted the ascene
, reviewed the accident
histo ry and concluded prior accidents were due
perc eptio n of the shar pnes s of the curve .... " to excessive speed and lack of
Finally, the cour t said, "It is also note
hy that the unco ntest ed
evidence was that the aggr egate warn ing wort
signs at the curve conformed to the
State Man ual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices."
Ther e was alcohol involved.
Stac k v. State (N.Y., 1989) involved a fatal ity in
a collision betw een a
motorcycle and automobile at an inter secti on with
no
three-color traffic light.
An engi neer ing study conducted by the DOT in
1979 recommended sign
impr ovem ents at the inter secti on by insta lling
dual "Stop Ahead" signs, oversized dual stop signs, and print ed "stop bars." The
dual oversized signs were
insta lled in 1980. The cour t held, "It is well estab
lishe
d that when a
mun icipa lity studi es a dang erou s condition and
deter
mine
s as part of a
reaso nabl e plan of gove rnme ntal services that
certa in steps need not be
take n, that decision may not form the basis oflia
bility."
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Challe v. Stat e (N.Y., 1989) involved a
fata lity whe n a vehicle left the
road way and hit a tree . Decedent's hus
ban
d con tend ed neg lige nt con stru ctio n
by faili ng to remove the tree s, both at
con
stru
ctio n in 1945 and duri ng resu
facing in 1969. The tree s wer e located
6 feet, 4 inch es from the pav eme nt. rThe clai man t argu es tha t gen eral ly acce
pted eng inee ring stan dard s and
the stat e's own stan dard s requ ire an 8-fo
ot
sho
ulde r in the acci den t area
Cla ima nt's eng inee r test ified tha t the
stat e's plan s for init ial con stru ctio .n
called for an 8-foot shoulder. Tho se plan
tree s 5 feet or mor e from the edge of the s also provided tha t all desi reab le
possible. The tree stru ck by the dece den finished pav eme nt be saved, if
t was not with in 5 feet and the plan s
did not call for removal.
The resu rfac ing plan s in 1969 liste d spec
ific tree s for removal. The tree in
this acci den t was not liste d. The rem ova
l
of
tree
s not on the list was left to
the eng inee r's discretion.
The re was test imo ny tha t the location
of the tree s viol ated gen eral ly
accepted eng inee ring stan dard s; however
,
thes
e wer e cert ain nati ona l
guid elin es tha t were not incl ude d in the
record.
The cou rt thor oug hly reviewed
exp ert eng inee r's test imo ny in the
con text of whe ther a violation of thethe
rele van t stan dard s was dem ons trate d.
The cou rt found ther e was no requ irem
provided. Fur ther , as ther e was no evident tha t an 8-foot sho ulde r be
no caus e of action for failu re to corr ect ence of any prio r accident, ther e was
an actu al or pote ntia l haz ard.
However, in D'Alessio v. Stat e (N.Y. 1989
) the cou rt uph eld a judg men t
for $15,035 for inju ries , incl udin g a frac
scar ring . The acci den t occurred whe n ture d rib, cuts, and perm ane nt
wat er, lost control, and hit a gua rdra il.a vehicle hyd ropl aned in stan ding
ade qua te mea sure s to correct this situ The stat e con tend ed it had take n
atio n. Tes timo ny of area resi den ts contrad icte d this contention. Wat er had been
accu mul atin g in this location
five yea rs, following hea vy rain s. The
cou rt held , "The evidence indi cate sfor
tha t
the stat e was awa re of or, in the exercise
been awa re of the con tinu ing wat er accu of reas ona ble care, shou ld hav e
were used ...The con stan t recu rrin g cond mulation. No flar es or war ning sign s
stat e .. .failed to mak e an ade qua te stud ition was longlasting. The
and wha t could be done to rem edy it .... y to asce rtai n the caus es of the dan ger
"
Illu min atio n case s
In Mullett v. State, (La., 1989) the stat
e was found to be 85 perc ent
neg lige nt on judg men t of$7,568,943
(red
million). Plai ntif f's motorcycle collided uced on app eal to slig htly over $5
tion of two stat e high way s. One high with ano ther vehicle at the inte rsec was a four-lane, med ian- sepa rate d
road. The othe r was a two-lane rura lway
road
the two-lane, forming a "T" inte rsec tion way. The four-lane term inat es at
. The re is a blin king amb er/r ed ligh t
with no othe r traffic signals. Approximat
ther e was an indu stria l facility, utili zing ely 200 feet east of the inte rsec tion ,
a brig ht whi te ligh t secu rity system.
The se ligh ts were inst alle d low to the
app roxi mat ing hea dlig hts approachinggrou nd and nea r a line of view
inte rsec tion to illu min ate it or reduce . The re were no stre et lam ps nea r the
the effect of the secu rity ligh ting upo n
app roac hing motorists.
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The median on the four-lane highway ends some 12-15 feet before the intersection. The recessed area is paved and unmarked . There were no
markings on the roadway to direct the motorist turning from the two-lane
onto the four-lane roadway.
At approxim ately 8:13 p.m., plaintiff was driving on the two-lane with the
intent to turn left onto the four-lane. A car was approachi ng from the
opposite direction. Plaintiff became confused as to the actual location of the
road and slowed. As he commenced his turn, he collided with the automobile
in the opposite lane and then struck a utility pole. There was a problem here
with the expert witnesses. Plaintiff's expert was a civil engineer working
primarily in highway design and signalization. He was not a traffic engineer.
The state failed to challenge his expertise at the trial court level and, therefore, could not do so on appeal. Neverthel ess, the Appeals Court found that
the witness's credentia ls supported his qualification as an expert. The trial
court accorded greater weight to this witness than to the state's expert witness.
The state's witness regularly testifies on such matters for highway
departme nts around the country. He stated that lighting of a rural intersection is not usually required and that there was nothing wrong with this
intersectio n. The trial court concluded that, "While Dr. __ was not the
typical 'hired gun,' he did lean too heavily toward advocating the position of
the DOTD and never gave any plausible reason for this court to believe ... that
the intersecti on was not hazardou s .... "
Other Testimon y at the Trial:
The traffic operation s engineer for the area determine d that the
amber/red signal would be appropria te. He had originally wanted it installed
in the exact center of the intersection. The maintena nce crew installed it
otherwise, but after inspection he agreed this was a better location and
approved it. Sometime in 1984, the departme nt received a complaint. A study
was made and it was determine d that it would be beneficial to place markings on the pavement to guide motorists. He recommended reflective
thermopla stic tape for better wear and visibility. The recommen dation was
made in October, installatio n did not take place until April (four months after
the accident).
Plaintiff's expert said the intersectio n was defective in having no
permanen t markings . He also stated that the absence of illuminati on affected
the ability of drivers to make a left turn without delay to locate the highway.
He cited an AASHTO Manual to the effect that driver confusion could cause a
decision delay of two-five seconds.
He also cited the MUTCD, Section 3A, relative to markings . He stated
that because of the unusual nature of the intersectio n, it was necessary to
channel traffic through a left turn to eliminate confusion caused by the
design, construction, and ambient lighting conditions.
The trial court concluded, ''Whether or not lighting is usually required in
a rural intersecti on, this court finds that this intersecti on was an unusual
one and that lighting of the intersectio n would have been one method to have
reduced the problems which contribute d to driver confusion .... " The court
found that there were several options available to the departme nt, none of
them very expensive. They included:
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1.

2.
3.
4.

lighting the intersection
marking the tum route
erecting traffic control signals as originally planned
adding another set of caution lights

The plaintiff suffered multiple fractures, brain injury, partial paraplegia.
He is unable to speak and has other neurological problems. He has difficulty
with balance and needs braces to stand, and is confined to a wheelchair. He
cannot breathe, feed, walk, or dress himself. He cannot communicate his
needs, thoughts, feelings, and desires. His immediate needs require 124
months in a post-acute institutional care program.
In Alyward v. Baer (Mo. 1987) a pedestrian was struck by one car, tossed
in the air, then a second car ran over her head and face. The plaintiff claims
the accident was caused by inadequate illumination. The court found that the
city was immune from suit on the grounds that the installation oflighting is
a governmental duty, performed for the good of all. The finding is supported
in the Missouri Tort Law Statue, RS Mo. 1985 § 537.600 which provides
immunity where the allegation is a deflective highway designed and constructed prior to 1977, where there was compliance with standards accepted
at the time.
The street lights in question were installed in 1952 and the completed
original system was accepted by the city and remained in place without
modification until February 7, 1981, when this accident took place.
In Scheurman v. DOT (Mich., 1987), decedent was struck and killed in
attempting to cross a highway at 10:15 p.m. She was apparently intoxicated.
The highway is a State Trunk Line highway. There were no street lights in
the vicinity of this accident. The defendant, DOT, argued it was not liable for
street lighting within Detroit on "nonfreeway" State Trunk Line highways.
However, the state reviews and approves all requests for lighting for safety.
The DOT occasionally requests modifications but makes no recommendations
as to poles or wattage. The court found that defendant DOT must incur all
legal liabilities for State Trunk Line highways, even where a municipality
undertakes responsibility for maintenance and repair.
Defendant also argues that its liability extends only to the improved
portion of the highway which does not include lighting. The court reviewed
prior case law and noted that lighting of a road affects the safety of motorists
and may be an integral and necessary part of road design in urban areas.
There may be a distinction between ornamental lighting and that integrated
into a road plan, but the court here held that although vehicle light poles may
be away from the highway, the illumination itself is on the highway and the
question then becomes whether this illumination was sufficient to render the
road safe for travel and for pedestrians. The case was remanded for further
proceedings to address the merits of whether street lighting was actually
required. However, in a more recent case (Alpert v. City ofAnn Arbor (DOT),
(Mich., 1988) in which a pedestrian was injured crossing a State Trunk Line
highway at 11:30 p.m.), it was argued that the artificial light provided by
street lights was inadequate and below safety standards. The court reversed
the decision in this case. The court now concludes that illumination or lack of
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illumin ation does not constit ute part of the improved portion of the
highw ay
design ed for travel.
In Lemire v. New Orleans Public Services (La., 1989), an accide nt
occurred at 3 p.m. when decede nt motori st struck a Sewera ge and Water
Board backhoe parked in a left traffic lane of a road on which water
main
repair had been underw ay for two weeks. There were a variety ofreas
the backhoe having been left; however, the job superv isor testifie d thatons for
barrica des were ordina rily left in place at the construction site. There
was
evidence that these had been knocked down.
An award of $200,000 was made. Fault was apport ioned 25 percen
t to
decede nt (who had a blood alcohol level of .21) and 50 percenat
t to the
Sewer age Board and 25 percen t to Public Service. With respec t to Public
Service, there was testim ony that severa l street lights were out and that
poor
lightin g contrib uted to the accident. The court found Public Servic
custod ian of the street lights. The fact that they were not operat inge to be the
is a
defect. The evidence suppor ts the conclusion that the poorly lit street
tribute d to the accident. The purpos e of street lights is obvious. They conintend ed to illumi nate the pathw ay of the motori ng public. When not are
functioning, it can be concluded that an unreas onable risk of
harm may occur.
Conclusion
Tort law has never been meant to replace insura nce. Legal theoris
contin ue to debate wheth er its purpos e is to stimul ate remed ial behavits
punish devian t actions, or to compensate. Clearly, there is some of or, to
all these
purpos es in every tort case. But the lessons for us in tort are not that
plex accide nts do happen ; it is that they genera lly involve motori sts compedest rians who are not the norma lly cautiou s people for whom we or
designing, and it is necess ary to take these factors into account. Thehave been
more we
do to minim ize human suffering, the less of a problem tort law
es. The
highw ay enviro nment may not be perfect, but we should never becom
stop
strivin
g
for this goal.

COMM ENTS

Oliver:
Conce rning tort liability, let me ask a hypoth etical questio Suppo
se you
have an 18-year old son who goes out with his friends. He has n.
three cans of
beer, is driving home, and runs off the road. Now, he has been drinki
maybe he is going 45 mph in a 25-mph zone. He wrecks his car and ng beer,
have a kid in a wheelc hair who can't talk for the rest of his life. Are now you
to say to yourself, "Highway engine ers are doing a fine job out there you going
not going to bring suit," or are you going to say, "Somebody's going toso I'm
have to
help me with the boy becaus e I can't carry this burden alone."
There are a numbe r of theorie s behind tort law. One is compensation
and
anothe r is deterre nce. But, someone's going to pay the bills. And, unfort
unately, it's going to come out of the highw ay depart ment's budget. That
is just the
way society works right now.
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Turner:
If you do any reading at all, you'll see this happens in state after state
after state. All of a sudden it impacts us and we are just swept off our feet
with suits. If we had've noticed what was going on around us in other states,
we could have prevente d it. These same suits you're talking about have been
going on from New York to California for 40 years.
In the United States, suits are often filed when the plaintiff has no hope
of winning, but he is bound and determin ed to do everythi ng he can to get it
off his conscious, to punish someone he thinks was wrong, and to do all he
can in the name of the loved one, whether that person is dead or alive.
Punitive suits are filed all the time, knowing they can't be won, just to punish
the defendan t. That's part of the United States legal system.
On the positive side, highway departm ents are winning the vast majority
of suits that are filed. We can win more. When we lose, we can only loose a
little bit of money, instead of $500,000.
In those states that are sovereign, the trend is for individu al employees,
instead of the state, to be sued. Ninety percent of the states have done that.
But in some states, the governm ent has made the choice-w e'll lose less
money if they sue our individu al employees instead of the departm ent.
Overall, it is positive because we're winning the great majority of these
suits. We can win more, but you've got to be informed by (1) learning what
the law does, (2) the grounds upon which you may be sued, (3) the conditions
that cause wrecks and suits. That is all part of your duty now. Twenty years
ago, you didn't have to worry about it. But, the law is dynamic, it changes.
The unfortun ate trends at the present time are that juries tend to overlook alcohol involvem ent and impairm ent, as well as speed, and that is
unfortun ate. But, if I'm an expert witness for somebody, I can certainly
testify that a diligent driver would never have had this wreck. The cause of
this wreck is not the low shoulder, it's the plaintiff 's inattenti on. I feel we can
win cases but we may not win them all.
Oliver:
I don't disagree with Dan's observation that individu al employees are
being sued. It is a fact of life; anyone can be sued and everyone in this room
(if they stay working for the government) probably will be sued sometime in
their career. It does not necessar ily mean that an individu al is going to be
found liable or that the courts are going to start imposing addition al liability.
We are going through this at the federal level right now in a lot of situations, under the tort claims act, and it is going to permeat e down to the state
level. It is my strong feeling that if you are acting within the scope of your
job, if you are acting within your general guidelines, you are not going to be
found liable. That does not mean that it's not going to be expensive. You
should have some insuranc e or you should make sure that the state is
indemni fying you because you can be sued. Our own highway adminis trator
has been sued, and if you want to see people get nervous, bring a law suit
against the top people in Washington, in their individu al capacity, for $12
million. The person is making $65,000 a year and has total assets of
$200,000. Sometim es we can get the Justice Departm ent to defend them and
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sometimes not. That depends upon an observation of how that person was
performing his job function.
If you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs, if you have a nervous
problem, or a medical disability or something that is going to inhibit the
performance of your job and make you less than diligent, then you are a
prime candidate for personal liability. Other than that, I don't see it.

Turner:
I completely concur with that. We only differ in the fact that in some
states individuals are targets. There is a tougher side to what David just
said. If you are a manager and one of your employees continuously is
negligent in the work he is supposed to do, is impaired on the job, or has a
physical disability that prevents him from doing his job as he should, you
may find yourself with liability.
Let me be very clear about disability. There's nothing wrong with having
a disabled person working for you if that job description allows that person to
do his job. There's nothing wrong at all with your helping a person with
alcoholism or emotional problems to get help, especially if your agency
provides for that. But, if you continually ignore an employee with a problem
like that and allow him to continue in his duties, and you have prior
knowledge of the situation, then you have a possible liability.
I know that there is at least one state that is sovereign and which has
refused to indemnify employees and refused to defend employees and refused
to purchase insurance for them. I would not work for state government in
that state.
Oliver:
We're talking about dysfunctional, not disabled. Someone mentioned
Dram-Shop Law where the tavern owner is held responsible for serving a
patron that one drink. The person goes out under the influence and then kills
someone. The liability is imputed and turned back to the tavern owner. This
is pervasive in society now. We are heading into an area, particularly at the
public level, where you are responsible for your actions, your brother's
actions, your sister's actions, your employee's actions, and the boss's actions
also. Nobody said it was easy.
Turner:
Let me emphasize what David said again, if you are doing your duties as
well as you can do them, if you are trying and reasonably understand the
ground rules of your job (the standard of care against which you are
measured), you are in good shape even if you are sued. You are doing what
you can. A plaintiff's attorney generally prefers not to sue individuals. The
studies show that a lawyer can get 4-1/2 times as much money for his client
(to restore his damages) ifhe sues a big, nameless company. You can make
more than twice as much money if you sue a government agency than if you
sue an individual person who has a face and a family and a name and sits
there at the table looking at you the whole time.
If you are doing your job and know the ground rules and are fulfilling
your job responsibilities as well as you can, then you are in good shape.
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Phillips:
Except-a nd lawyers like to deal with exception s-the more you support
limitation s on state liability the harder it is for someone to get into the state's
pockets and the more likely they are going to be looking back to your pocket.
These things swing back and forth and you've got to be very careful.
If someone in this room came to me and said, "I have a problem. I have
been wronged and I need compensation. I want remedial action, I want someone to pay attention to me." You better believe that I'm going to start turning
the chairs over in here, ifl have to, to find some way. Don't think I wouldn't.
You're going to find whoever is going to pay for your client. As a good lawyer,
you have to. If you don't, you're going to be sued.
Turner:
The purpose of civil law is to allow damaged parties to be restored. That's
what David just told you. When someone has been damaged, they need a
route to be restored to their previous condition.
You are not a special target because you are a public employee. Quite the
contrary. For 125 years, you have enjoyed protection that was not available
in the private sector. One out of five consulting civil engineeri ng firms in the
United States last year carried no insurance . That meant if they were sued,
they bellied-up, gave up all their assets and started a business somewhere
else.
Oliver:
Whatever you leave with here today, don't leave with the idea that law is
going to motivate or direct or command your performance. The law is something that you have to pay attention to in terms of tort liability, but it is
something that should be placed on the back shelf. What you, particular ly the
younger engineers in this room, should leave here with is that you have got to
do your job in accordance with the best education and the best knowledge you
have. You've got to know and follow the guidelines. You've got to pay attention to what your standards are as an engineer, and that's how you do your
job. Tort liability will take care of itself. Don't let it swing you, don't blame it,
don't use it at as a crutch. Know your profession and do your work.
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